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GEOGRAPHY AND LAW 
Bernhard Grossfald* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The central questions of comparative law are still unsolved: Which le-
gal institutions in what legal cultures can be compared with each other in a 
meaningful way? What can we learn from comparative law for the solution 
of our own problems?1 
These questions are even more acute today than they were only a few 
years ago when comparative law was still in its age of optimism. Compara-
tive law was then widely regarded as an efficient tool for finding solutions 
to our own legal questions within foreign legal systems. Today such opti-
mism has faded and has even given way to a deep skepticism. This is indi-
cated by speculations about "the law of the non-transferability oflaw."2 We 
are thus confronted with a new challenge, which makes it necessary to dis-
cuss again the possibilities and limits, the powers and failures of compara-
tive law.3 
The general trend today is to view the transferability of law as a func-
tion of political and economic similarities between legal cultures. The em-
phasis is on the social and political power structure, on the East-West and 
North-South conflicts.4 Other authors emphasize the communality of cul-
tural values,5 or the similarity of the "Weltbild."6 All these aspects cer-
tainly have their merits, but they have even more serious limits. They 
* Professor of Law, University of Muenster; Director, Institute of Comparative Law. Dr. 
Juris. 1960, University of Muenster; LL.M. 1963, Yale University; Habilitation 1966, Tueb• 
ingen. -Ed. 
1. On the use of comparative law, see M. RHEINSTEIN, EINFUHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSVER· 
GLEICHUNG 37 (1974); 1 K. ZWEIGERT & H. KOTZ, EJNFUHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSVER· 
GLEICHUNG 12 (1971); Ancel, Valeur actuelle des eludes de droil compare, in XXTH CENTURY 
COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW; LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HESSEL E. YNTEMA 15 
(1961) [hereinafter cited as YNTEMA LEGAL ESSAYS]; Schmitthoff, .Die kiit!ftigen Alffgaben der 
Rechtsvergleichung, 33 JZ 495 (1978). 
2. See, e.g., Hiller, Language, Law, Sports and Culture: The Traniferability or Non-Trans-
ferability of Words, L!festyles, and Altitudes Through Law, 12 VAL. U.L. Rev. 433 (1978); 
Wr6blewski, Problems of Incomparability in Comparative Law, 53 RJVISTA INTERNAZIONALE 
DI FILOSOFIA DEL DIRITTO 92 (1976). 
3. See generally L. FRIEDMAN, DAS RECHTSSYSTEM IM BLJCKFELD DER SOZIALWISSEN· 
SCHAFTEN (1981). 
4. o. KAHN-FREUND, ON USES AND MISUSES OF COMPARATIVE LAW 37 (1974); McWhin-
ney, Toward the Scientific Study of Values in Comparative Law Research, in YNTEMA LEGAL 
ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 29. 
5. See, e.g., Constantinesco, .Der Rechtsbegr!ff in der Makro-Vergleichung, 80 ZVGLRW1ss 
177 (1981); Constantinesco, Ideologie als dete_,:minierendes Element zur JJi/dung der Rechts• 
kreise, 19 ZFRV 161 (1978); Constantinesco, Uber den Stil der "Stiltheorie" in der Rec/1tsver-
gleichung, 78 ZVGLRW1ss 154 (1979); Drobnig, The Comparability of Socialist and Non• 
Socialist Systems of Law, 3 TEL AVN U. STUD. L. 45, 56 (1977). 
6. See Wahl, Klimatische Ei,!fl/Jsse alff die Entwicklung des Rechls in Ost und Wes/, in FEST• 
SCHRIFT FUR PHILIPP MOHRING 1, 6 (1975). 
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cannot explain why comparative law is so difficult even between Europe 
and the United States, or between Continental Europe and England. Here 
we find similar political structures, similar economic standards, shared cul-
tural values - yet still very great difficulties when it comes to comparative 
law. 
George Bernard Shaw's view that England and the United States "are 
two countries separated by a common language" is more true today than 
ever. An American observer recently mentioned "the radical differences 
between the legal systems of the United States and those of the Conti-
nent."7 Or to put it in poetry: "Born on the other side of the sea, we are as 
different as people can be."8 The same feelings prevail between the Conti-
nent and England. Both sides regard the other's law as "very different" -
to put it mildly - not to say "strange." The North Sea is probably no 
longer "the best thing I know between France and England," as Douglas 
Jerrold once said, but at least in law it might still be regarded, in Lewis 
Carroll's words, as true that "the further off from England the nearer to 
France." 
So far, the present methods in comparative law have not sufficiently 
explained these tensions. This leads to the suspicion that important factors 
are often overlooked - probably because they are too apparent. These 
factors include primarily the natural environment (particularly the geo-
graphical situation of a country), the climate, population density, and lan-
guage and religion.9 These factors are of utmost importance in 
comparative law. They are normally the first differences we are confronted 
with when going abroad; as legal scholars, we must give them our intensive 
attention. 
This Article will discuss the relations between geography and law. I 
have already discussed the subject of language and law elsewhere;10 with 
regard to religion and law, I refer the reader to the extensive writings of 
Harold Berman. I I 
II. THE PIONEERS 
The influence of geography on law was first emphasized by the French 
legal philosopher Montesquieu. I2 He saw the main hindrance for legal 
transplants in the geographic-climatic character of any law. Pascal depicted 
the geographic character of law more sarcastically: 
[W]e see neither justice nor injustice which does not change its nature with 
7. Aldisert, Rambling Through Continental Legal Systems, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 935, 935 
(1982). 
8. R. RODGERS & 0. HAMMERSTEIN, SOUTH PACIFIC 79 (act 1, scene 1) (1949). 
9. See Stein, llses, Misuses-and Nonuses of Comparative Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 198, 
199, 207 (1977). 
10. Grossfeld, Sprache und Recht, 39 JZ I (1984). 
11. See H. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION (1974); Berman, Theologi-
cal Sources of the Western Legal Tradition, 46 REV. JuR. U.P.R. 371 (1979); Berman, The 
Religious Foundations of Western Law, 24 CATH. U.L. REV. 490 (1975); Berman, The l'!fluence 
of Christianity Upon the .Development of Law, 12 OKLA. L. REV. 86 (1959). 
12. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, Books 14-18 (T. Nugent trans. 1949) (1st ed. 
n.p. 1748). 
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change in climate. Three degrees of latitude reverse all jurisprudence; a 
meridian decides the truth. . . . A strange justice that is bounded by a 
river! Truth on this side of the Pyrenees, error on the other side.13 
Despite these early recognitions and the later authority of Eugen Ehr-
lich, 14 the idea that geography conditions any legal culture faded into the 
background.15 This was probably caused by the increase in traffic, the rise 
of technology, and the industrial revolution in general. These develop-
ments made the natural assumptions and limitations inherent in a legal or-
der less visible. In today's age of environmental concerns, however, they 
appear again before our eyes. Not too long ago, for instance, the West Ger-
man Minister of the Interior explained that the use of unleaded gas could 
not be made compulsory in West Germany, as it had been in the United 
States and Japan. He pointed out that because the United States occupies 
most of a continent and Japan is an island, neither country has to worry so 
much about trips of its citizens into neighboring states and the availability 
of leaded gas there. Thus, differences in geography help account for differ-
ent legal rules. 
Lately, Horst Neumann-Duesberg16 and Eduard Wahl17 have pointed 
more specifically to the significance of geography for law, Wahl relying 
heavily on suggestions made by Tetsuro Watsuji in his bookA Climate. 18 
Hans Baade has applied similar ideas to problems of constitutional law. 19 
Other pioneers include Langhans-Ratzeburg, who in 1928 coined the term 
"geojurisprudence" (Geojurisprudenz),2° which mainly, but not exclu-
sively,21 referred to the cartographic presentation of law, and Merk, who 
spoke of "legal geography" (Rechtsgeographie) in 1926.22 
Ill. PRELIMINARY REMARKS 
Indeed, geography is fate. Fate not only for a country but also for its 
13. B. PASCAL, PENSEES Fragment 294, at 83-84 (W. Trotter trans. 1931) (1st ed. Paris 
1670). 
14. E. EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 505 (W, Moll 
trans. 1936) (referring to the work of Frederic Le Play, which was based on investigations of 
the local conditions of social life). 
15. But see E. VON LASAULX, NEUER VERSUCH EINER ALTEN, AUF DIE WAHRHEIT DER 
TATSACHEN GEGRUNDETEN PHJLOSOPHIE DER GESCHICHTE 82 (E. Thurner ed. 1952). 
16. H. NEUMANN-DUESBERG, SPRACHE IM RECHT 20 (1949). 
17. Wahl, supra note 6, at 1. 
18. T. WATSUJI, A CLIMATE; A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY (1961); see also N. DJUVARA, 
CIVILISATIONS ET LOIS HISTORIQUES (1975); Y. NODA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE LAW 58 
(1976); K. WITTFOGEL, DIE ORIENTALISCHE DESPOTIE (1962); von Bar, Die Entwicklung des 
siidefrikanischen Zivilrechts dargestel/t an Fragen des Heftungsrechts, 42 RABELSZ 87, 98 
(1978). 
19. H. BAADE, DAS VERHALTNIS VON PARLAMENT UND REGIERUNG IM BEREICH DER 
AUSWARTIGEN GEWALT DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 19, 21 (Veroffentlichungen des 
Instituts f"tir Intemationales Recht an der Universitiit Kiel No. 46, 1962). 
20. M. LANGHANS-RATZEBURG, BEGRIFF UND AUFGABEN DER GEOGRAPHISCHEN 
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT (GEOJURISPRUDENZ) (1928). My acknowledgements to Hans w. 
Baade, of Austin, Texas, for this pointer. 
21. See M. LANGHANS-RATZEBURG, supra note 20, at 62. 
22. See w. MERK, WEGE UND ZIELE DER GESCHICHTLICHEN RECHTSGEOGRAPHIE (1926). 
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culture and its law. A paradigmatic example of geographic-climatic influ-
ence is the fact that the Islamic colonization in Spain has never passed the 
boundary line of olive tree cultivation (41° latitude).23 Beyond that, the 
geographic environment colors the law and enables or hinders the transfer 
of legal institutions. This is obvious when looking at the extremes - for 
example, the law of the Esk.imos24 or of desert peoples. The Supreme Court 
of the Philippines expressed this in a very picturesque way by saying that 
law often acquires "a characteristic coloring from the change of 
environment."25 
I became aware of this environmental context when investigating the 
question of why English law is so "different." When I spoke to Kurt Lip-
stein in Cambridge about this issue, he answered: "Please don't forget -
there is always the Channel!" Certainly English law is influenced by the 
Roman law and by the European ius commune of the Middle Ages, 26 but its 
character is defined by the insular situation. That character is also a conse-
quence of the early centralization brought about in London by the 
Normans, a result of the strategic position of that city. The significance of 
an insular position can be seen even more clearly in Japanese law.27 
Once the idea of geography's significance has come up, the immediate 
question is whether there is a general underlying principle. One first recalls 
the claims of the anthropologists concerning the early territorial stamping 
of human beings28 and the territorial principle in modem law. One is re-
minded of the geographically defined legal proverb in Frisia: "W er nicht 
will deichen, muss weichen" (whoever does not want to build a dike must 
go). We think about construction codes in areas with earthquakes, or dif-
ferent zoning ordinances in areas with many or few sunny days, for exam-
ple in Naples and Hamburg. But the influence of geography on law goes 
even further. A classic example is the change English law underwent when 
it was transferred to the United States.29 
23. See 1 c.w. PREVITE-ORTON, THE SHORTER CAMBRIDGE MEDIEVAL HISTORY 372 
(1952). 
24. See E. HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN 67 (1954). 
25. Javellana v. Mirasol, 40 Phil. Rpts. 761, 775 (Phil. Sup. Ct. 1920). 
26. See A. EHRENZWEIG, PSYCHOANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE 110-15 (1971); Coquillette, 
Legal Ideology and Incorporation (pts. I & II), 61 B.U. L. REv. 1, 315 (1981); see also Mer-
ryman, On the Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law and the Common Law, 17 STAN. 
J. INTL. L. 357 (1981). 
27. See Kim & Lawson, The Law of the Subtle Mind: The Traditional Japanese Conception 
of Law, 28 INTL. & COMP. L.Q. 491, 492-93 (1979). 
28. See Abbas, Earliest hunters staked out boundaries, FORUM-SOUTHERN METHODIST 
UNIVERSITY, Feb. 28, 1983, at 5, in which such research by Professor Sampson is reported. See 
also J. WOHLWILL & G. WEISMAN, THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT AND BEHAVIOR: AN ANNO-
TATED BIBLIOGRAPHY AND GUIDE TO THE LITERATURE 152 (1981); Cashdan, Territoriality 
Among Human Foragers: Ecological Models and an Application to Four Bushman Groups, 24 
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 47 (1983). 
29. See, e.g., G. BAKKEN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW ON THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN FRON-
TIER: CIVIL LAW AND SOCIETY, 1850-1912 (1983); Wengler, Die Anpassung des Englischen 
Rech ts durch die Judikatur in den Vereinigten Staaten, in 1 FESTSCHRIFT FUR ERNST RABEL 39 
(1954); see also M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); 
Holt, Morton Horwitz and the Transformation of American Legal History, 23 WM. & MARYL. 
REV. 663 (1982); Williams, Book Review, 25 UCLA L. REV. 1187 (1978); Winship, Book Re-
view, 31 Sw. L.J. 751 (1977). For a contrast to Horwitz's view of American legal history, see 
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Let us take as a first example the water laws. The transfer of water 
laws from a country with plenty of water (England) to the arid southwest-
ern United States caused serious social tensions, eventually bringing about 
a change in those laws.30 What happened? While English common law 
followed the riparian rights theory, giving rights to the water to the owner 
of the land adjacent to the water, the courts of the West and Southwest 
developed the law of appropriation. As a consequence of the motto "First 
in time, first in right," those persons got priority who first made a "reason-
able use" of the water. The reasons for this change can be found in a deci-
sion of the Supreme Court of Colorado from 1879: 
The climate is dry, and the soil, when moistened only by the usual rainfall, 
is arid and unproductive; except in a few favored sections, artificial irriga-
tion for agriculture is an absolute necessity. Water in the various streams 
thus acquires a value unknown in moister climates. . . . Deny the doc-
trine of priority or superiority of right by priority of appropriation, and a 
great part of the value of all this property is at once destroyed. 
We conclude, then, that the common law doctrine giving the riparian 
owner a right to the fl.ow of water in its natural channel upon and over his 
lands, even though he makes no beneficial use thereof, is inapplicable to 
Colorado. Imperative necessity, unknown to the countries which gave it 
birth, compels the recognition of another doctrine in conflict therewith.31 
Similar changes can be observed with regard to the law pertaining to 
withdrawal of water from land. The English rule of unlimited with-
drawal32 (from "England's green and pleasant land")33 changed to the pre-
dominant American rule of a "reasonable use," taking account of a 
"correlative right": water can only be taken out for a reasonable use bal-
ancing the consequences for the neighboring land.34 
Kahn-Freund, English Law and American Law- Some Comparative Reflections, in EsSAYS IN 
JURISPRUDENCE IN HONOR OF ROSCOE POUND 362 (R. Newman ed. 1962); Pound, The JJevel• 
opment of American Law and Its JJevialionfrom English Law, 67 LAW. Q. REV. 49 (1951). 
30. See Wengler, supra note 29, at 53; Wiel, F!fty Years of Water Law, 50 HARV. L. REV, 
252 (1936); Williams, Optimizing Water Use: The Return Flow Issue, 44 U. COLO. L. Rev. 301 
(1973). For a wide-ranging perspective, see M. HORWITZ. supra note 29, at 34. For modern 
variations of these transfer problems, see Taubenfeld & Taubenfeld, Wind Energy: Legal Is• 
sues and Legal Barriers, 31 Sw. L.J. 1053 (1977); Williams, Solar Access and Proper/)' Rights: A 
Maverick Analysis, 11 CONN. L. REV. 430 (1979); Comment, The Allocation of Sunlight: Solar 
Rights and the Prior Appropriation .Doctrine, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 421 (1976). 
31. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446, 447 (1882). 
32. See Acton v. Blundell, 12 Mees. & W. 324, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. Ch. 1843); see also 
City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 292, 276 S.W.2d 798, 800, 801 
(1955). 
33. City of Pleasanton v. Lower Nueces River Supply Dist., 263 S.W.2d 797,800 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1953). 
34. Basset v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569 (1862); see also W. PROSSER, SELECTED 
TOPICS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 149-64, 171-72 (Univ. of Mich. Law School, Thomas M. Coo• 
ley Lectures, Fourth Series, 1953). 
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V. STRICT LIABILITY 
But the effects of geography on law go still further. They explain, for 
example, why the English rule in Rylands v. Fletcher35 did not become the 
law in Texas. According to the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, the owner of 
land is responsible for damages resulting from the storage of water on his 
land. The Supreme Court of Texas, however, did not accept this rule: 
In Rylands v. Fletcher the court predicated the absolute liability of the 
defendants on the proposition that the use of land for the artificial storage 
of water was not a natural use, and that, therefore, the landowner was 
bound at his peril to keep the waters on his own land. . . . This basis of 
the English rule is to be found in the meteorological conditions which ob-
tain there. England is a pluvial country, where constant streams and 
abundant rains make the storage of water unnecessary for ordinary or 
general purposes.36 
The court was of the opinion that the situation in Texas was quite different 
from the one in England: 
A large portion of Texas is an arid or semi-arid region. West of the 98th 
meridian of longitude, where the rainfall is approximately 30 inches, the 
rainfall decreases until finally, in the extreme western part of the state, it is 
only about 10 inches. This land of decreasing rainfall is the great ranch or 
livestock region of the State, water for which is stored in thousands of 
ponds, tanks, and lakes on the surface of the ground. The country is al-
most without streams; and without the storage of water from rainfall in 
basins constructed for the purpose, or to hold waters pumped from the 
earth, the great livestock industry of West Texas must perish. No such 
condition obtains in England. With us the storage of water is a natural or 
necessary and common use of the land, . . . and obviously the rule an-
nounced in Rylands v. Fletcher, predicated upon different conditions, can 
have no application here.37 
As an additional argument the court referred to the special situation of 
Texas as an oil producing state: 
Again, in England there are no oil wells, no necessity for using surface 
storage facilities for impounding and evaporating salt waters therefrom. In 
Texas the situation is different. Texas has many great oil fields, tens of 
thousands of wells in almost every part of the state. Producing oil is one of 
our major industries. One of the by-products of oil production is salt 
water, which must be disposed of without injury to property or the pollu-
tion of streams. The construction of basins or pounds [sic] to hold this salt 
water is a necessary part of the oil business.38 
VI. FENCING IN, FENCING OUT 
The fencing problem is, in my eyes, the most beautiful and most dra-
matic example of geographically enforced change in the law.39 This prob-
35. 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (1868). 
36. Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 128 Tex. 155, 164, 96 S.W.2d 221, 225 (1936). 
37. 128 Tex. at 165, 96 S.W.2d at 226. 
38. 128 Tex. at 165-66, 96 S.W.2d at 226. 
39. See generally D. MEINIG, IMPERIAL TEXAS: AN INTERPRETATIVE EsSAY IN CULTURAL 
GEOGRAPHY (1969). My acknowledgements to Professor Joseph McKnight from the Law 
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lem developed in the middle of the last century in the Midwest and 
Southwest of the United States as a struggle between ranchers and farmers 
- the classic Cain-and-Abel conflict.40 
Under the common law, ranchers had to "fence in" their cattle.41 If the 
ranchers failed to do so, they had to pay compensation for the damage done 
by the cattle to their neighbors' fields. This rule meets the needs of a 
densely populated country in which farming has to be protected and pro-
moted as the most intensive form of agricultural production. Under differ-
ent geographic conditions, however, the rule of "fencing in" changed into 
its opposite, the rule of "fencing out."42 
Some court decisions explain in detail the reasons behind this change. 
For example, in 1948 the Supreme Court of Illinois said: 
However well adapted the rule of the common law may be to a densely 
populated country like England, it is surely but ill adapted to a new coun-
try like ours. If this common law rule prevails now, it must have prevailed 
from the time of the earliest settlements in the State, and can it be sup-
posed that when the early settlers of this country located upon the borders 
of our extensive prairies, that they brought with them and adopted as ap-
plicable to their condition a rule of law, requiring each one to fence up his 
cattle; that they designed the millions of fertile acres stretched out before 
them to go ungrazed, except as each purchaser from government was able 
to inclose his part with a fence? This State is unlike any of the eastern 
states in their early settlement, because, from the scarcity of timber, it must 
be many years yet before our extensive prairies can be fenced, and their 
luxuriant growth sufficient for thousands of cattle must be suffered to rot 
and decay where it grows, unless the settlers upon their borders are permit-
ted to turn their cattle upon them.43 
The court concluded that the common law rule "does not and never has 
prevailed in lllinois."44 
The consequence was that the farmer had to put up fences in order to 
protect his fields against any damage from straying cattle ("fencing out"). 
As the Supreme Court of Kansas explained in 1869: "The owner of real 
estate does not use reasonable and ordinary care and diligence to protect his 
property from the intrusion of roaming cattle unless he incloses it with a 
lawful fence."45 
The Supreme Court of the United States summarized this development 
in 1890: 
[The principle of the liability of the cattleowner] was ill-adapted to the 
nature and condition of the country at that time. Owing to the scarcity of 
School of Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas, for his very valuable suggestions. 
Mr. McKnight placed material that he had collected at my disposal. See also Coase, The 
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & EcoN. 1 (1960). Coase uses the fencing problem to illustrate 
his theorem. 
40. See 3 DIE RELIGION IN GESCHICHTE UND GEGENWART, col. 1090 (3d ed. TUbingen 
1959) (under the keyword "Kain und Abel"). 
41. See G. WILLIAMS, LIABILITY FOR ANIMALS (1939). 
42. For details see J. INGHAM, THE LAW OF ANIMALS 258-69 (1900). 
43. Seeley v. Peters, 10 ill. (5 Gilm.) 130, 142 (1848). 
44. 10 Ill. (5 Gilm.) at 143. 
45. Union Pac. Ry. v. Rollins, 5 Kan. 98, 104 (1869). 
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means for enclosing lands, and the great value of the use of the public 
domain for pasturage, it was never adopted or recognized as the law of the 
country. . . . Indeed, it is only within a few years past, as the country has 
been settled and become highly cultivated, all the land nearly being so 
used by its owners or by their tenants, that the question of compelling the 
owner of cattle to keep them confined has been the subject of agitation.46 
Many prairie states enacted "fencing-out" statutes.47 Behind all this lay 
the struggle for an open ranch,48 perceived by the "fencecutters" as vital to 
bringing their cattle to the chief markets in the East, as well as to gaining 
access to water. This struggle even became the theme of a popular song: 
"Oh give me lands, lots of lands under starry skies above, don't fence me 
in." 
The legal situation differed in its details from state to state.49 However, 
the general rule, which had once adopted "fencing out" over the common 
law "fencing in," later changed back to "fencing in."50 The main reasons 
for that reversal were the increase in population and the change in attitude 
towards pastureland and farmland. Decisive, however, were three technical 
developments: First, the railroad solved the problem of transportation and 
made it possible to bring the wood needed for fences into the prairie states; 
second, the invention of barbed wire in the 1870's allowed the fencing of 
great areas, 51 and created fences that were strong enough to hold the half-
wild longhorns; finally, arrival of the iron windmill made it possible to 
pump up water wherever it was needed, so fences no longer blocked the 
way to water. A reminder of this famous dispute still lives today. In the 
musical Oklahoma by Rodgers and Hammerstein, this song can be heard: 
The farmer and the cowman should be friends! 
Oh, the farmer and cowman should be friends! 
The one man likes to push a plow, 
The other likes to chase a cow, 
But that's no reason why they can't be friends! 
46. Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 328 (1890); see also Lazarus v. Phelps, 152 U.S. 81 
(1894); Garcia v. Sumrall, 58 Ariz. 526, 535, 121 P.2d 640, 644 (1942): 
The result was that if the old co=on law rule of trespass was applied, it would have 
been practically impossible to use these federal lands for grazing, for the animals running 
at large thereon, due to their natural instincts, would be practically certain to trespass 
upon any privately owned lands lying adjacent to the open range. 
47. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 28, 1838, ch. 76, 1838 Ark. Laws 450; Act of Mar. 31, 1855, ch. 59, 
1855 Cal. Stat. 70; Act of Jan. 11, 1866, ch. 15, 1865-1866 Dakota Laws 472; Act of Jan. 29, 
1864, 1863 Idaho Laws 594; Act of Jan. 27, 1835, 1834-1835 Ill. Laws 144; Act of Feb. 5, 1840, 
1839-1840 Tex. Laws 179. These statutes typically embrace a "fencing out" rule by stating that 
a person could recover for damage caused by the trespassing animals of another !f his own 
lands were enclosed by a sufficient fence. See Clarendon Land, Inv. & Ag. Co. v. McCelland, 
89 Tex. 483, 34 S.W. 474 (1896); Ford v. Taggert, 4 Tex. 492 (1849). 
48. See generally C. RICHTER, THE SEA OF GR.Ass (1937) (a novel dealing with open range 
themes). 
49. For an overview, see J. INGHAM, supra note 42, at 265-67. 
50. See generally w. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
TORTS 706-07 (7th ed. 1982), for a brief overview of the "fencing in" /"fencing out" contro-
versy in the United States. 
51. See H. MCCALLUM & F. MCCALLUM, THE WIRE THAT FENCED THE WEST (1965); 
Gates, The Devil's Rope, TEXAS HIGHWAYS, Sept. 1982, at 24; Kalez, Barbed Wire Benny, THE 
CATTLEMAN, Jan. 1972, at 50. 
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We may be tempted to regard these events as stories from the Wild West 
that should not be taken too seriously. But it is startling that the norm of 
"fencing out" was already part of the Spanish law when Texas still be-
longed to Mexico.52 This, however, must not induce the conclusion that the 
Spanish example shaped the later American rule.53 The American rule de-
veloped independently. Geography alone was decisive: it was stronger 
than legal culture and history. 
VIL FURTHER EXAMPLES 
Examples may be easily multiplied. Note, for instance, the difference 
between the "incorporation theory" (England) and the "real seat theory" 
(Continental Europe) in international company law.54 These rules devel-
oped in different geographical environments and reflect their heritage even 
today. The same is true for corporation laws in general, as can be seen by 
looking at Delaware and Liechtenstein and comparing the characteristics of 
their respective corporation laws. Similarly, geography influences the 
choice of a particular tax system. Why else does the income tax preponder-
ate in the United States, whereas the turnover tax is the major tax in Eu-
rope? The answer lies at least partly in geography: A turnover tax tends to 
burden consumption and is thus the more appropriate tax for a culture that 
puts a premium on savings in view of scarce natural resources - an ap-
proach that is typical of the European tradition.55 The catch-phrases "tax 
haven" and "off-shore funds" must also be mentioned in the context of ge-
ography and tax. These phrases actually connote the nature of a law by 
reference to a particular geographic situation. 
Another element in the influence of geography on law is the difference 
in sheer size between countries, the feeling of seemingly inexhaustible land 
reserves which informs, for instance, the American character and is a main 
element of American law. It is also clear that an increase in population 
increases the need for the legal protection of the private sphere, that formal-
ity becomes more important.56 It makes a difference in law and social be-
havior when, instead of twenty-two persons (USA), two-hundred-fifty 
persons (West Germany) live on one square kilometer. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This short essay shows us that the relations between geography and law 
- though so often overlooked - have far-reaching implications. Any in-
52. W. MYRES, THE RANCH IN SPANISH TEXAS, 1691-1800, at 25 (1969). 
53. Jordan, The Origin of Anglo-American Cattle Ranching in Texas: A J)ocumen/alion of 
l)!Jfusionftom the Lower South, 45 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 63 (1969) (disputing the thesis accepted 
by many that Anglo-American cattle ranchers in Texas learned from Mexican ranchers), 
54. See, e.g., A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 14-16 (1976). 
55. B. GROSSFELD, DIE EINKOMMENSTEUER 8 (Recht und Staat in Geschichte und 
Gegenwart No. 504/505, 1981). 
56. See generally Privacy as a Behavioral Phenomenon, 33 J. Soc. IssuES l (1977); see also 
Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 692 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426 (5th 
Cir. 1981); Report of Committee A, 1980-81, 67 ACADEME Bulletin of the AAUP 176, 181-85 
(1981) (Chairman of Committee, M. Finkin, commenting on judicially compelled disclosures 
of decisions by academic bodies). 
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depth comparative research must take this factor into account. We have to 
be aware of the fact that a change in the geographical environment in itself 
might change the function of a given legal institution. It is very difficult, if 
not often impossible, to predict in which direction this change might go. 
The conclusion is clear. Geographical factors can help us understand a 
foreign law, but by the same token they make comparisons more difficult. 
Comparative law offers no easy way to borrow solutions from other legal 
cultures. There is, however, no reason to fall from exaggerated optimism 
into complete pessimism. Notwithstanding all difficulties, we have quite a 
few examples of successful legal transplants. Seeing the problems more 
clearly is often the first step to coping with and overcoming them - though 
the way may be long and hard. 
